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DISABILITY AND SLIPPERY SLOPES
A
shley is a nine year old girl who, as
an infant, developed static
encephalopathy with global
deficits. She currently functions at about
the level of a 3 month old with severe
physical and mental deficits.  She
cannot move on her own, and is cared
for at home by her parents.  When Ashley
entered a growth spurt and started
developing secondary sexual
characteristics about three years ago, her
parents began exploring options that
eventually were realized in what they call
“the Ashley treatment.” To address the
concern that Ashley would not understand
the pain and discomfort of monthly
menstrual periods, her uterus was removed.
To avoid the discomfort of large breasts
(more so because her wheelchair straps
cross over her chest, and because
hormonal treatments that were part of the
“treatment” would enhance breast
development), her breast buds were
surgically removed.  Lastly, to keep her
from growing so that her parents and other
caregivers could more easily transport her,
she received a 2-1/2 year course of high
dose estrogen, which fused the growth
plates in her bones. As described on the
blog where Ashley’s parents explain their
choices for Ashley, keeping Ashley smaller
means she “can continue to delight [in]
being held in our arms and will be taken
on trips more frequently and will have more
exposure to activities and social
gatherings.”  See http://
ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/.
The recent debate surrounding the
“Ashley X” case provides an opportunity
to shine the light on disability, how it is
defined and its role in surrogate decision-
making. Reactions across the globe swept
through the media after Douglas Diekema,
chair of the ethics committee that reviewed
Ashley’s case at Children’s Hospital and
Regional Medical Center in Seattle, co-
authored a paper about “the Ashley
treatment” (Gunther & Diekema, 2006).
Charges that the Ashley treatment was
unethical fell into two general categories:
(1) the harms to Ashley outweighed the
benefits, and (2) the precedent contributes
to a larger disability bias in society that
undermines the rights and flourishing
potential of persons with disabilities. The
ethics committee deliberated on, and
ultimately rejected, #1. While those
involved in the ethics case consultation
expressed concerns related to #2 (Clarren,
2007), their ethical analysis stayed
focused on Ashley.
In considering the degree to which an
ethics committee might consider
implications for society or “slippery slope”
arguments when deliberating on a case like
Ashley’s, it might be helpful to review how
this case fits within the greater “disability
rights” discourse.  Outrage among some
disability rights advocates that Ashley’s
body was medically modified to make it
easier to take care of her (even if this was
not the parents’ primary reason for doing
so) touched a nerve among those who have
fought against the “medical model” of
disability. In this view, those who cannot
attain “species-normal” functioning (e.g.,
seeing, hearing, ambulating, etc.) are
considered disabled. Attempts are made to
normalize their functioning to the extent
possible by surgical repair, rehabilitation,
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NEWS
MARYLAND HEALTH
CARE ETHICS
COMMITTEE
NETWORK (MHECN)
On January 30
th, MHECN sponsored
a symposium at GBMC on Money &
Medicine: Bedside Ethics of the
Medical Marketplace.  See article in
this issue, p. 4, for more information about
the event.  On July 26th, MHECN is
sponsoring a one-day education
conference, Ethics Committees in Action,
for ethics committee members.  See
Calendar for details, and check our
website for updated information:
www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn.
Contact MHECN at (410) 706-4457;
or e-mail MHECN Program Coordinator,
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, at
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu.
METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON
BIOETHICS NETWORK
(MWBN)
After serving as Executive Director ofthe Metropolitan Washington
Bioethics Network for 16 years, Joan
Lewis is stepping down from that
position.  A new Director has not been
identified to date.
RICHMOND BIOETHICS
CONSORTIUM (RBC)
RBC partnered with the Department of Veterans Affairs Employee
Education System and the Mid-Atlantic
Health Care Network to present the
course, “Mediation Skills for Ethics
Consultants” on May 30, 2007. RBC holds
its elections this spring.
For more information about RBC,
contact:  Gloria Taylor, RN, MA, CPTC,
RBC President, at taylorgj@unos.org.
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or use of adaptive aids. (In Ashley’s case,
the medical and surgical interventions even
went beyond attempts to “normalize”
Ashley—they would keep her size and
appearance closer to her 3 month old stage
of development rather than her
chronological age, something that many
disability rights activists find morally
unjustifiable.) The question about what is
“normal” and thus what constitutes a
“disability” is influenced by cultural norms
and currently available medical technology,
and has its own body of literature (see
Vehmas, 2004).
In contrast, the “social model” of
disability views the problem being not with
the individual who is impaired, but with the
society that oppresses, stigmatizes, and
isolates that individual. For example, a
woman who is paralyzed may ambulate
with a wheelchair, but only becomes
disabled when she must rely on others to
open a door or help maneuver a curb due
to lack of ramped curbs and doors that
automatically open. According to the
social model, we should strive to remove
attitudinal and structural barriers that
prevent all people from participating in
society to the best of their abilities (see
http://www.disabilityisnatural.com/). We
should do this in a way that maximizes
individual autonomy and dignity.
Unfortunately, there is a strong
tendency for able-bodied/minded persons
(“abled-persons”) to judge the quality of
life of disabled persons as inferior.
History has shown that such attitudes
can lead to blatant rights violations,
ranging from involuntary sterilization of
women who are thought to be
intellectually impaired to eugenic killings.
Disability advocates are mindful of this
history when they react to societal
endorsement of practices such as prenatal
screening for genetic diseases. The
implication that parents could abort a
fetus to avoid having a “disabled child” is
(according to some disability activists)
dangerously close to the conclusion
drawn by Hitler’s ranks that people with
disabilities are better off dead.
Interestingly, the social model of
disability originated from individuals with
physical disabilities who advocated
removing attitudinal and physical barriers
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that preclude acceptance of persons with
impairments into mainstream society
(McClimens, 2003). While the same model is
used to promote rights of persons with
intellectual disabilities (e.g., mental
retardation), some contend that the social
model is biased against those with
intellectual impairments. Other models have
emerged, such as the “People First”
movement, which endorses accommodating
the needs of those with physical or
intellectual impairments by focusing on their
abilities rather than their impairments and
seeing them as valued persons first and
foremost. However, even within this
movement, there is an assumption that
disabled persons have some level of
cognitive capacity. The beliefs posted on
one state’s “People First” website (http://
www.peoplefirstofillinois.org/index.html)
unwittingly reflect this assumption:
·We believe every person should go to
a regular school
·We believe that people have a right to
speak for themselves and make their
own decisions
·We believe everyone should have the
opportunity to live in the community
and to have REAL jobs for REAL pay.
For people like Ashley who are so
impaired (in her case, both cognitively and
physically) that making her own decisions
is an impossibility, one must question
whether the disability rights discourse is
excluding people like her, or whether using
the term “disabled” to describe her is a
misnomer. Advocating for Ashley’s
“rights” as a disabled person seems to be a
misread of the principle of “respect for
persons,” which requires that persons who
can make their own decisions be allowed to
do so (within certain limits), and that
persons who cannot make their own
decisions be protected from harm. For
people in the latter category who never
had and will never have decision-making
ability (like Ashley), others must make
decisions for them based on a best interest
standard, not based on an autonomy claim.
It is understandable that those who are
disabled and who have decision-making
capacity feel threatened and frustrated by
others’ false assumptions about their rights,
worth, and abilities. However, projecting
such frustrations onto all impaired persons
leads to fuzzy logic.  Gregory Liptak, a
pediatrician who works with children who
are developmentally disabled, illustrated
this tendency when commenting on
Ashley’s case:  “What they did to this child
takes away her personhood. She’s a human
being and with that comes all the same
rights as you or I have to experience normal
development and sexual pleasure” (Clarren,
2007).  Liptak’s comment resonates for
many disability rights advocates, but
doesn’t apply to Ashley, who cannot
experience consensual sexual pleasure.
The focus of the Clarren article was that
the process by which the ethics committee
reached consensus in Ashley’s case was
over-simplified, and that there were more
divergent views among members than was
presented to the press.  Clarren cites
pediatrician bioethicist Chris Feudtner as
saying, “This lack of an auditable record [of
how the ethics committee deliberated]
leaves any internal dissension or debate
squelched from view, leaving the sense this
was an easy decision for the committee to
make, when that may not have been the
case.” The implication is that the committee
should have considered the potential
impact on others with disabilities, and not
restricted their debate to Ashley alone.
Feudtner is quoted as saying, “Some child,
somewhere, with much less severe mental
disability than Ashley, will get this
treatment. It will happen and there needs to
be more people standing up and saying this
will have side effects we didn’t anticipate.”
An internet blogger presented an
alternative view: “It’s time that doctors, and
advocates for the disabled, and the general
public, started to recognize that we can’t
base treatment for one person on what
might happen to others. People deserve to
be treated in a way that is best for them, not
in a way that is best for someone with some
other level of disability” (“jebldmm,” 2007).
On one hand, including slippery slope
arguments when deliberating in an
individual case consultation seems
unfair to the patient and family, who
should be the primary focus of the
deliberation. But perhaps this is the
price we have to pay for the choices we
now have at hand. Our love of
enhancement technologies and high-tech
medicine that seeks to overcome human
limitations is at odds with the reality that
medical technology is actually increasing
disability prevalence in society. Neonatal
intensive care units and trauma centers
are saving lives while creating infants
with a full range of physical and
cognitive impairments, and adults with
brain damage from head trauma. At the
same time, there is a tendency among
abled-persons to want to maintain
control and avoid “devastating
outcomes” of being alive without a
perceived “good quality of life.”
Research has shown that abled-persons
underrate the quality of life of others
who have physical and cognitive
impairments, and are poor predictors of
their own future preferences, were they
to become impaired. Such biases
threaten the fairness of health care
decisions made on behalf of a patient
when disability is at issue.
So, we are left with several puzzles and
challenges. We need to include in our
ethics case consultations marginalized
voices like those of persons with
disabilities, who are too often ignored,
inappropriately infantilized, or devalued by
mainstream society. But the voices of
disabled persons who can communicate
with us may not accurately represent those
who can never speak for themselves.
Caregivers of persons who have limited or
no decision-making potential should be
part of the conversation. And how do we
address slippery slopes when our main
obligation is to the individual in front of us?
Mairs (1996, p. 120) wrote, “People who act
on principle are likely to sacrifice the
individual for the agenda, which is
frequently shaped by their own, often
_______________________________________
For people like Ashley who are so impaired (in her case, both
cognitively and physically) that making her own decisions is an
impossibility, one must question whether the disability rights
discourse is excluding people like her, or whether using the
term “disabled” to describe her is a misnomer.
_______________________________________
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CONFERENCE EXPLORES COST,
MEDICINE AND ETHICS CONSULTS
T
he issue of health care cost has
been a taboo subject in the
patient-provider encounter. This
may be because health care providers
believe cost should not influence health
care treatment decisions, or because they
do not know how to broach the topic with
patients. Yet, cost concerns have a real
impact on patients, families, and
institutions. To address the issue of cost
in more depth, MHECN co-sponsored the
symposium, “Money & Medicine:
Bedside Ethics of the Medical
Marketplace,” at the Greater Baltimore
Medical Center on January 30, 2006.
Speakers delivered remarks on the
issue of costs in decisions to withhold or
withdraw life sustaining treatment after
attendees acted as an ethics committee in
considering a case in which the cost of
medical treatment may have influenced
decisions made at the bedside. The case
involved a man with end-stage lung
cancer who requested that he remain on a
ventilator through his death to avoid
suffocating. His physician agreed, but an
ICU attending later decided that
ventilatory support was inappropriate for
its intended purpose of achieving a
peaceful death. That physician decided to
discontinue the ventilator without
mentioning to the patient’s family that the
cost of the patient’s stay in the ICU had
exceeded the patient’s insurance
coverage for it, so that the hospital stood
to minimize its financial losses if the
patient died sooner rather than later. The
question posed to the “audience as
ethics committee” was, should cost be a
consideration in the ethics committee’s
deliberation on the case, and if so, how?
When thinking of conflicts over health
care costs, we often think of situations
where health care providers or institutions
are looking after their own financial
interests. But keeping a patient alive can
have significant financial implications for
the patient and his or her family. For
example, a stay in the ICU for just a week
can cost thousands of dollars, pushing
some uninsured patients into bankruptcy.
Marion Danis, Head of the Section on
Ethics & Health Policy in the Department
of Clinical Bioethics at the National
Institutes of Health, gave sobering
statistics about the societal and personal
costs associated with end of life care for
cancer patients in the U.S., including the
facts that: 1) bedside rationing does
occur; 2) medical care costs have risen
dramatically; and 3) patients and families
are paying an increasing proportion of
those costs.  Danis identified ways that
physicians currently ration at the
bedside, both implicitly and explicitly.
Most physicians currently do not discuss
the financial implications of health care
decisions with patients or family
members, perhaps due to lack of
communications expertise in this area and
a shared belief that physicians do not and
should not consider cost in making
treatment recommendations. Danis
believes physicians should inform
themselves about the impact of cost on
medical care, and that they should
develop the expertise to discuss not only
the potential benefits and risks of a
procedure or treatment but also its costs.
She explored the potential impact of such
disclosure on patient care.
Fairness, Danis suggested, might be
enhanced through such disclosures by
prompting physicians to consider cost in
justifying their decisions for choosing
one treatment over another (for example,
ordering an expensive lab test that may
not improve clinical outcomes for the
patient). A more consistent practice of
financial disclosure might also protect
against discriminatory practices in which
rationing decisions are unfairly targeted
toward only certain patients.
Danis further suggested that
provider-patient trust could be
enhanced if patients were told directly
about rationing decisions and the basis
for them, rather than finding out later
from a source other than the patient’s
physician.  For example, even though
the ICU attending in the case study may
have correctly concluded that a
ventilator is an inappropriate palliative
intervention to avoid suffocating while
dying, the patient’s family may perceive
that the decision was motivated by cost
if they discover that the hospital stands
to financially benefit from the ventilator
withdrawal. Informing the family of the
financial facts along with the palliative
standard of care to achieve a peaceful
death, Danis contends, may help to
preserve trust and empower patients and
families to make informed choices. For
example, in the case study, if the
patient’s continued stay in the ICU was
no longer covered by insurance, the
hospital might bill the patient (or his
estate) for unreimbursed costs of
treatment. If the physician who offered
continued ventilator support had
explained this to the patient, along with
the full range of palliative care options,
the patient may have made different
choices.  Furthermore, explicit
discussions of medical finances may
enhance patient well-being by
identifying sources of financial stress
and providing information, reassurance,
or referral to assist patients with
financing their medical care.
Danis suggested that ethics
consultants recognize the influence of
bedside rationing (both implicit and
explicit), that they model discussions
about financial conflict, and that they
advocate proactive conversations about
how patients and families cope with
financial issues. Symposium attendees
debated the pros and cons of having
physicians take on this additional duty,
given their poor performance
communicating with patients about end-
of-life care.
Rebecca Elon, Associate Professor of
Medicine at Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine and Clinical
Associate Professor of Medicine at the
University of Maryland School of
Medicine, explored the prevalence and
types of bedside rationing and their
influence on the practice of medicine.
One example of a common bedside
rationing device is the use of clinical
practice guidelines. There is also price-
based rationing (limiting access to a drug
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or treatment based on price), insurance-
based rationing (traditional indemnity or
managed care), and individual clinical
judgment (for example, giving a less
expensive clot-dissolving agent to a
stroke patient admitted to the
emergency department).  Elon explored
the conundrum that bedside rationing is
unavoidable if Americans want to
control health care costs, but that it may
come (ironically) at a price. Because
current approaches to bedside rationing
are often invisible and unacknowledged,
there is a risk of discriminatory rationing
and threats to provider-patient trust.
Devising more ethically just ways of
rationing health care resources without
damaging trust or violating the
physician’s duty to advocate for the
patient is the challenge that lies ahead.
Diane Hoffmann, Professor of Law
and Director of the Law & Health Care
Program at the University of Maryland
School of Law, spoke on “Costs,
Benefits and Medical Futility – Policy
Approaches to Limiting Health Care at
the Margins.” Hoffmann argued that
costs, to the extent that they play a role
in health care decision making at the
margins, should not be a matter for
clinicians at the bedside but rather
should be a result of policy debates at
the state or national level. While health
care providers and institutions are
important actors in these cases,
decisions made at the bedside are more
likely to be subject to claims of bias and
discrimination. Therefore, any decision
to incorporate costs into the treatment
equation should be a result of
considered deliberation by elected
officials who can take into account the
voices of the numerous stakeholders
concerned about this issue.  She also
cautioned that in the medical futility
context, cost is really only an issue
when there is some benefit to continued
treatment. If there clearly is no benefit,
there should be no need to consider
costs. The problem, she asserted, is that
often there is not agreement on whether
there is any benefit. Patients or their
family members often think there is some
deeply buried, presuppositions about what
constitutes an acceptable life.” Ironically,
one could argue that basing an objection
to “the Ashley treatment” on potential
harm to less-disabled individuals does
just what Mairs, a disability rights
advocate, bemoans—sacrifices Ashley
for the disability rights agenda. Surely
that can’t be the right course. I suspect
the answer lies somewhere in between.
The potential impact on others of a
particular medical treatment decision
should not be the primary focus of an
ethics case consultation. But it should be
a consideration somewhere in the
process, particularly when deliberating on
precedent-setting cases where unexplored
personal biases may create blind spots
that warrant careful reflection before
coming to consensus and communicating
recommendations to the public.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
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benefit when health care providers do not.
Once we begin to balance benefits and
costs, or allow health care providers to do
so, we start down a slippery slope and also
quickly intrude on the legal authority of the
patient’s family members to make decisions
based on the patient’s best interest, i.e.,
whether the benefits of a proposed
treatment outweigh the burden.  While
burdens can include costs, it is the patient’s
family, not the physician, who decides how
much weight to give them. The intractability
of defining medical futility has led to a view
that policies should focus on process not
substantive criteria as a way to resolve
conflicts over futile care.
Hoffmann discussed one state that had
adopted a process approach to resolving
these conflicts. The Texas Advance
Directives Act includes a procedure for
resolving disagreements about treatment
decisions “at the margins.” The law
provides that in cases where families wish
to continue medical treatment but the
physician decides that continued treatment
is “medically inappropriate” (a term which
the law does not define), an ethics
committee is authorized to review the
physician’s decision. If the committee
affirms the decision of the physician and
no alternative provider can be found to
treat the patient within ten days, the
patient’s life sustaining treatment can be
withheld or withdrawn over the objections
of the patient and/or his family members.
Despite the statutory procedure, a number
of cases decided under the law have been
criticized because of the perception that
cost, or the fact that the patient was
uninsured, was a factor. Hoffmann
discussed how one might improve upon
the Texas statute by designing a process
that is perceived as fairer by third party
observers.
At the end of Hoffmann’s presentation,
attendees discussed the benefits and
drawbacks of the Texas statute. By a show
of hands, the majority of attendees
opposed it, however, a significant minority
felt that it was a good law, striking the right
balance between patient/family and health
care provider concerns about medically
futile care.
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ADDRESSING THE “JUDGMENT TRANCE:”
WHY ETHICS CME'S SHOULD BE
REQUIRED FOR PSYCHIATRISTS
Y
ou have 20 years of clinical
experience under your belt.  You
feel that you know your
strengths, weaknesses, and limits.  You’ve
come to believe that the therapeutic
relationship is the key “medically active
ingredient” in treatment.  So, you start to
think that it is the most important thing
to develop, enhance and preserve in your
work with patients.  You are treating a new
patient who believes that much can be
learned from you; not just your knowledge
but the way you live your life.  You
respond. You share stories about your
life: your marriage, your struggles
parenting your child, your experiences in
college. The patient really resonates.  This
encourages you to start sharing more
vulnerable stories – episodes that have
much in common with the patient’s
experience.  You find yourself sharing how
a professor in college crossed some lines
with you, got too close, actually seduced
you.  The patient feels your pain, because
it’s similar.  Next session, you get a gift
from the patient. It’s food. The patient
invites you to share the food.  You need no
further reflection, after 20 years, than to
check in with your own feelings.  It feels
right.  Develop the relationship, don’t allow
the patient to feel rejection. You prepare
your coffee table to share the repast. The
next session is a beautiful day, you move
out to the balcony together and share food
again. Feels right. Next session, another
gorgeous day, and the park across the
street seems like an inviting therapeutic
environment.  So you move the session out
there, it’s like having a class outdoors on a
beautiful day in college – no harm done.
The following session, you get up in the
morning, see the weather is fine again,
know that it’s a hot day, so that morning
you dress in something more comfortable
and casual for outdoors. It’s slightly more
revealing, but it feels comfortable, and
that’s important.  Towards the end of
that session, after eating, coffee feels right,
so you and the patient swing by the cafe
for a cup.  The therapeutic relationship is
deepening, the patient is trusting you more
and more. You’re getting to material that
has never been reached before. You are
feeling very effective, the sensation of a
senior therapist, at ease in your complex
art.  You find yourself looking forward to
these sessions.  In fact, you start to make
sure that there is nobody else scheduled
immediately after this patient’s hour, so
you can linger a bit longer over coffee.  It
helps to move the session to the last one of
the day. You are increasingly aware that
you are treating a truly remarkable person,
and feel fortunate for the serendipity of
being matched up by referral and chance. 
Indeed, you feel that your years of
experience permit you to try stretching,
taking slight extensions of conventional
technique, bending technical rules that are
really designed more for beginners, to help
structure their introductory years in the ill-
defined and elusively broad art of therapy. 
Like training wheels, you sense there is a
point where typical conventions are
oversimplified and even unnecessary. This
isn’t something you can or even need to
talk about with any colleague.  They
probably wouldn’t understand.  They have
to be here, in this particular therapeutic
relationship, to really get it.  Only you can
get it.  It took 20 years, but you’re really
feeling you are starting to get it. 
And so it goes: the slow procession of
feelings, rationalizations, and instincts
which propel you down a self-determined,
well meaning, and increasingly self-
deluded path.  You drift  further and
further “off-the-reservation,” a satisfying
journey which, one day, ends in surprise,
when you are being interviewed by the
Maryland Board of Physicians about this
case.  Where did you go wrong?  Did you
ever know you had?
For the last few years, as Chairman of
the Clinical Ethics Committee for Sheppard
Pratt Health Systems, I have been called
upon widely to give lectures on topics in
Medical Ethics, with a specific focus on
ethical issues in mental healthcare. The
audiences are almost always social
workers and psychologists; rarely, if ever,
is there a psychiatrist in the audience.
Why is this?  It turns out that for some
years, both of these professions have
required not just continuing education
credits to renew their licenses to practice,
but specifically, 3 credits yearly in ethics.  
In contrast to our fellow mental health
professionals, though we are required to
have yearly credits to renew our licenses
as physicians, there are no specific
requirements for psychiatrists to take
courses in any particular area, let alone
ethics. 
I want to argue that a requirement in
ethics training for physicians in general,
psychiatrists in particular, should be
implemented, in parallel with the already
established requirements of social
workers and psychologists.   
Historically, physicians were long
resistant to the idea of medical ethics as
an important clinical discipline.  There
was a sense that it belonged in a course
in philosophy departments or at special
“think tanks” like the Hastings Center for
Bioethics in New York, but not in
hospitals, on rounds, or in grand rounds. 
However, that recalcitrance has gradually
eroded, partly with the help of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
which, over the last decade, has started
to require that hospitals have an Ethics
Committee, which could be consulted by
staff or patients.  Even prior to this, the
federal government instituted the
requirement of an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) to review any protocol for
human experimentation for ethical
soundness.
One need not look past the headlines
to observe that we live in times of great
ethical confusion and misbehavior in
many professions.  My own work with
ethics consultations in health care
systems and on the Maryland Psychiatric
Society (MPS) Peer Review committee
has revealed to me that there is indeed
considerable ethical confusion and
misadventure (both knowingly and
unknowingly) among psychiatrists. 
Systematic ways of thinking through
moral conundrums do exist and have
been developed in the formal field of
Medical Ethics.  These processes are not
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necessarily merely a matter of following
one’s intuition.  Indeed, I have seen
“clinical intuition” lead many a
psychiatrist astray in this domain.  The
ever increasing pressure to make
decisions quickly, to spend less time with
patients and less time in consultation
with colleagues, have all combined to
increase the chance of clinical behavior
that is not just substandard, but frankly,
unethical.  
It turns out that considerable thought,
writing, and discussion has been taking
place in the field of medical ethics over
the last few decades, which is keeping up
with developments.  Issues that have
challenged ethical thinking are evolving.
Such issues as the ethics of relating to
managed care organizations, doctor/
patient boundaries, and patients refusing
treatment are some examples of issues
about which thinking has been rapidly
evolving in systematic ethical
analysis.  Critical thinking about these
areas is advancing, much as neuroscience
and pharmacology are advancing.  Yet there
is little opportunity to avail oneself of
training in these matters. Indeed, the
demands of more concrete and procedural
knowledge, such as psychopharmacology,
can be seductive and can lead one away
from the “softer” topics when considering
how to spend precious CME hours.   
Moreover, there are not many CME
hours out there for ethical training of
psychiatrists.  I recently had an
opportunity to give an hour lecture on a
CME closed-circuit TV and web cast
program. Though asked for more, it was
impossible for the producers to find
underwriters for more ethics broadcasts. 
In contrast, underwriters (read:
pharmaceutical companies) were standing
in line to sponsor programs on treatments
of illnesses with pharmacotherapy.
The fact is that mandating continuing
education in ethics for social work and
psychology produced a market for such
courses, and suddenly, they were
commonly available. In my experience,
they are eagerly attended, not simply
because they are mandated. Attendees
seem to find this training of immediate
value to common practice conundrums. 
These seminars actually help to raise basic
awareness of when one is actually on
ethically controversial ground – a basic
awareness that, though fundamental, is
often lacking.  It is one thing to know how
to skate on thin ice; it is another thing
entirely to learn how to recognize that the
ice is getting thin.
More than any other kind of healing
professional, therapists and psychiatrists
are often soloists.  What we do is, by
necessity, very private.  Typically, we are
utterly alone with our patients.  This
makes us vulnerable to creating a
hermetically sealed zone in which our
clinical judgment is deployed, without
being readily accessible to feedback from
other authoritative colleagues or
sources. My work on the MPS Peer
Review Committee demonstrates to me the
kind of “judgment trance” that can be
fostered, in which progressive
rationalizations can lead to a subtle,
gradual drift away from standard ethical
practice. Unfortunately, it is often left to
the patient or family member to ring the
alarm bell, signaling that the psychiatrist is
“off-the-reservation.”  One need only read
the report of sanctions by the Maryland
Board of Physicians to see that
psychiatrists are overly-represented in
that roll call of dishonor. 
 I submit that this is not surprising,
considering the nature of psychiatric work. 
That means that psychiatry has a
particular need for ethical education to
cultivate a more robust and effective ethical
self-monitoring.  
This is the reason that I think it is time
for psychiatrists to join the good sense of
their  colleagues, the social workers and
psychologists, and require mandatory
continuing education in one particular
area – ethics.  The zeitgeist of our
increasingly ethically confused society
calls for it, the virtue of humility in the face
of a complex clinical art calls for it, and last
(and least) – our malpractice attorneys call
for it.
Mark S. Komrad, MD
Chairman, Clinical Ethics
Sheppard Pratt Health Systems
Member, Maryland Psychiatric
Society, Peer Review Committee
“VALUE” MNEMONIC IMPROVES
ICU END-OF-LIFE COMMUNICATION
Researchers found that when the following mnemonic device was used in
a family conference to discuss end-of-life treatment decisions for a patient
nearing death, family members were more likely to feel heard and
supported, and were more likely to concur with a decision to forgo life-
sustaining treatment, than were family members who participated in a
family conference in which the mnemonic was not used.
V = VALUE what family members say
A = ACKNOWLEDGE their emotions
L = LISTEN
U = UNDERSTAND the patient as a person by asking questions
E = ELICIT questions from family members
Lautrette, A., et al. (2007). A communication strategy and brochure for
relatives of patients dying in the ICU. The New England Journal of
Medicine, 365:469-478.
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One of the regular features ofthe Newsletter is the presentation of
a case considered by an ethics committee
and an analysis of the ethical issues
involved.  Readers are both encouraged
to comment on the case or analysis and to
submit other cases that their ethics
committee has dealt with.  In all cases,
identifying information about patients
and others in the case should only be
provided with the permission of the
patient.  Unless otherwise indicated, our
policy is not to identify the submitter or
institution.  Cases and comments should
be sent to MHECN@law.umaryland.edu,
or MHECN, the Law & Health Care
Program, University of Maryland School
of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore,
MD 21201.
CASE STUDY––LIFE-
SAVING SURGERY AGAINST
PATIENT’S WISHES
In this issue, we present an actual case
that was recently featured in a New
York Times article.
D
r. Michael E. DeBakey, a
previously healthy 97 year old
cardiac surgeon, suffered a
dissecting aortic aneurysm, a condition
for which he himself devised the surgical
repair. Fearing that surgery for a man his
age would leave him severely mentally or
physically impaired, he opted to accept
his impending death. Over the next few
weeks, he was cared for at home with
conservative measures to prevent aortic
rupture, an unlikely outcome without
surgery. He periodically went to the
hospital for imaging tests to measure the
aneurysm’s size. It grew from 5.2 to 6.6 cm
over a 3 week period, and about 2 weeks
later, was up to 7.5 cm.
Eventually, he agreed to hospitalization.
At this point, his kidneys had failed, and
there were signs that the aneurysm was
leaking. A do-not-resuscitate order was
written, and a note written in his chart
CASE PRESENTATION
stating that he did not want surgery to
correct the dissection. He told his
physician and long-time colleague both
that it was “time for nature to take its
course,” but also that the doctors had to
“do what they need to do.” He then
became unresponsive. His family insisted
that the doctors operate, as it was his only
hope of surviving. They reasoned that he
would want what they want. The
surgeons who knew him well thought they
should operate, but the anesthesiologists
were reluctant to go against his prior
stated wishes, particularly since he was a
poor surgical risk due to advanced age.
An ethics consult was called.
Source:  “The Man on the Table was
97 but He Devised the Surgery,” by
Lawrence K. Altman, New York Times,
December 25, 2006.
COMMENTS FROM A
CLINICAL ETHICIST
W
hile the specific details of Dr.
DeBakey’s case are unique,
the issues the case raises for
ethics consultants and hospital ethics
committees are not.  Beneficence is at
play, as surgery will provide the best, if
not only, chance to repair the aneurysm.
Non-maleficence, on the other hand,
might compel a physician not to provide
a risky surgery that could severely harm
an elderly patient.  While these are
important considerations, neither seems
to provide absolute guidance.  A patient
in his or her 90’s may be otherwise
healthy and able to tolerate surgery, thus
justice (as fairness) could also be an
important consideration, in ensuring that
a patient would not be denied a
potentially curative treatment based on
age alone.  At the same time, respect for
patient autonomy would support a
capacitated patient’s right to refuse a
potentially beneficial treatment.  Since the
patient’s wishes are somewhat unclear
and in dispute in the case at hand, issues
and questions about patient autonomy
provide the crux of the ethical dilemma
posed in the DeBakey case.
The main questions that the ethics
committee must consider upon being
consulted are whether or not surgery in
this situation would be against the true
wishes of the patient, and whether the
family members are acting as appropriate
surrogate decision makers at this point in
time.  Since the patient initially decided to
remain at home and not undergo surgery
upon diagnosis, some clinicians involved,
such as the anesthesiologists who
reportedly raised questions in this case,
felt that proceeding with surgery at this
point in time may not be consistent with
the patient’s wishes.  On the other hand,
at the time of the ethics consult, the
patient had recently consented to
hospitalization after spending a number of
weeks at home, which may reflect a shift in
his preferences for treatment of the
aneurysm.  In examining whether this shift
is significant and representative of a true
shift in the patient’s preferences for
treatment, it is natural to turn to the
patient’s most recent statements of his
preferences.  However, the patient’s
statements about nature taking its course
and doctors doing what they have to do
can be interpreted as rather contradictory.
Thus, an ethics committee needs to seek
further guidance as to what exactly the
patient meant by these statements in the
situation as it currently stands.
The natural people to whom a healthcare
team and/or ethics committee would turn to
clarify a patient’s statements about his or
her wishes would be a patient’s family
members.  Additionally, the patient’s
spouse would be the legally authorized
surrogate decision maker in the state of
Texas absent a properly executed medical
power of attorney.  Ethics committee
members must always be careful to assess
whether a surrogate decision maker is
appropriately using substituted judgment
to make decisions as to what the patient
would have wanted in a particular situation.
If a surrogate decision maker seems to
clearly be imposing their own wishes on a
patient, contrary to a patient’s known
wishes, the ethics consultant/committee
  Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter  9
members have a responsibility to raise this
concern.  Surrogate decision making can be
a very emotional process, and having an
ethicist or ethics committee to actively help
a surrogate think through how to
appropriately make decisions on behalf of
an incapacitated patient may be very
helpful to the surrogate, and very helpful in
achieving an ethically sound outcome.
When, in a case such as DeBakey’s, it is
difficult to ascertain the patient’s actual
wishes, and it is also difficult for some
members of the team to have complete
confidence in family members’ assessments
of the patient’s wishes, should ethicists
and committee members feel comfortable in
trusting the family to lead the decision
making process?  Tia Powell has observed
that family members are very often the
best-suited individuals to engage in
empathetic communication that helps find a
patient’s “voice” when a patient is
incapacitated, as family members have
intimate knowledge of the patient and his
or her personality.  Family members know
their loved ones in a complex way that a
healthcare provider usually does not, and
this knowledge of a person’s manner of
making complex decisions can be
invaluable when the patient’s wishes are
truly unclear.
In this case, I would recommend that
the ethics committee and healthcare team
engage family members in an active way
as partners in medical decision-making to
determine why they believe the patient
would desire surgery now when he
explicitly rejected surgery a number of
weeks before.  Knowing what they know
about the patient and how he thinks, were
his directives to his physicians at his
diagnosis likely based on his condition at
the time or were they absolute?  Would he
have changed his mind given his
worsening condition?  Does allowing
nature to take its course mean rejecting
treatment options altogether to this
particular patient, or only not attempting
resuscitation if the patient were to arrest?
All of these are legitimate questions which
the family may be able to answer from the
patient’s perspective much better than a
physician, nurse, or other provider.
While the patient seems to have
strongly rejected a surgical intervention
in the past, the team and the ethics
committee must be aware that patients are
allowed to change their minds.  If the
committee feels after this exploration with
the family that the patient likely would have
changed his mind in recent days given his
condition, or that his seemingly conflicting
statements most likely do not represent an
outright rejection of surgery, then the
surgery would be ethically justified.   At the
same time, individual professionals may still
be uncomfortable proceeding given the
controversy in the case, and this hesitancy
should also be honored by allowing these
providers to remove themselves from
involvement in the case.
Finally, both the professionals involved
as providers and the members of the hospital
ethics committee must be cognizant of their
own biases and conflicts in a situation such
as this.  In Dr. DeBakey’s case, many staff
members at his hospital through the years
may have come to have a personal
relationship with him.  On one hand, these
personal relationships could be valuable in
assessing what his wishes likely would have
been and whether or not the family was
honoring those wishes.  On the other hand,
this could also serve to cloud the judgment
of some professionals.  The key is to be
aware of personal relationships an ethics
consultant or committee member might have
with the subject of an ethics consultation,
and try to ascertain how this is influencing
the recommendations being made.  If at all
possible, ethicists and committee members
with personal connections to a patient or a
situation being brought forward for ethics
consultation should not be involved in the
formulation of ethical recommendations.
While Dr. Debakey’s particular case
leaves many questions, it also helps us
think about potential answers.  Being
prepared in advance for encountering
situations with similar ethical issues can
help ethics consultants and committee
members function much more effectively to
bring about ethically sound resolutions.
Chad F. Slieper, JD
Clinical Ethicist
Clinical Ethics Service Instructor
Department of Critical Care
MD Anderson Cancer Center
Houston, TX
References
Altman, L. “The Man on the Table was
97, but He Devised the Surgery,” New
York Times, December 25, 2006, p. A1.
Powell, T. (2005). Voice: Cognitive
Impairment and Medical Decision
Making, Journal of Clinical Ethics¸16:4,
303-313.
COMMENTS FROM A
BIOETHICIST
O
ne of the issues that first
comes to mind after reading a
case like this is the
complexity of respecting a patient’s
autonomous wishes when such
wishes appear to change over time.
Adding to the complexity in this
particular case is the fact that the
patient became incompetent to make
an autonomous decision after he had
given contradictory statements
shortly before he lost consciousness.
At stake here then are both the
authenticity of the patient’s wishes
and the standards of surrogate
decision-making. An additional
complicating factor in this scenario is
the background and the celebrity of
the patient at stake – a famous
cardiothoracic surgeon whose very
specialty was the exact surgery he
was subjected to.  In this response, I
will try to explore the several pieces
that make this such a fascinating and
essentially educational ethical puzzle.
First, let us look at the issue of
authenticity of this patient’s wishes.
When this patient, retired
cardiothoracic surgeon Dr. DeBakey,
was first diagnosed with his
potentially life-threatening aortic
aneurysm, he consciously chose to
adopt a “watchful-waiting” strategy.
The progression of his disease was
closely monitored, but essentially left
untreated, as per the patient’s clearly
stated preferences. Knowing that he
could and probably would eventually
Cont. on page 10
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die if the aneurysm would burst, he
appeared to accept this fate. Considering
his wealth of knowledge and experience in
this area, his decision would have to be
regarded as well-informed and voluntary.
When the aneurysm had progressed to a
dangerously large size and had started to
cause kidney problems, however, he did
allow himself to be hospitalized for
treatment. This could be interpreted as a
change of mind about his treatment plans.
Key questions here are if DeBakey did
indeed autonomously revoke his prior
decision and if that was authentic for him.
As Beauchamp and Childress state,
deciding whether particular actions are
autonomous may depend, in part, on
whether they are in character or out of
character. As a life-long surgeon, inventor
of one of the more invasive and dramatic
surgical interventions, it certainly seemed
in character for DeBakey to choose
surgery over palliative care. Even stronger,
the previous decision not to operate may
have seemed out of character to his family
members. Perhaps this explains why the
family, as his surrogate decision-makers,
felt that DeBakey, a surgeon himself,
would have wanted surgery.
The fact that a DNR order was written
still does not preclude a preference for
surgical intervention, as it specifically
refers to life-saving measures in case of
an emergency, such as sudden cardiac
arrest. Performing an essentially non-
emergency procedure, namely, repairing
the aneurysm before it burst, would not
be considered resuscitation. Being so
well-known at his hospital, DeBakey’s
celebrity and reputation as a dedicated
surgeon obviously contributed to the
general opinion that he would have
wanted to undergo surgery—except for
the anesthesiologists, both the treating
surgeons and the family agreed that this
was the best decision at that time. Once
the decision to treat was made, the
surgical team followed through with
every measure necessary even in the
course of (to be expected) complications
and the need for temporary mechanical
ventilation, and despite the advanced age
of the patient. While not every
nonagenarian would necessarily be
offered this intense treatment for a variety
of possible reasons, the chosen course of
action did seem appropriate and
consistent in this case, especially
considering the eventual positive
outcome. Had DeBakey become fully and
indefinitely dependent on mechanical
ventilation or other life-supporting
measures, then the surrogate decision-
makers could have reconsidered the
situation at that point. Fortunately, they
did not have to make such a life-and-
death decision.
This brings us back to the issue of
surrogate decision-making. As
Beauchamp and Childress explain, in
current biomedical ethics an ordered
set of standards for surrogate
decision-making is favored, running
from (1) autonomously executed
advance directives, to (2) substituted
judgment, to (3) best interests. The
first two are, according to Beauchamp
and Childress, essentially identical, as
they both are founded in pure respect
for autonomy. They go on to state that
in absence of reliable traces of wishes,
surrogate decision-makers should
adhere only to the best interest
standard. In this case, there were quite
contradictory statements and
documents to guide the surrogate
decision-making process. First, there
was the note in the chart that DeBakey
did not want surgical correction of his
aortic dissection. This appears to be a
sufficiently clear and ethically binding
written advance directive, to be
respected by the family as surrogates.
(Whether it was legally binding would
depend on whether it was witnessed in
accordance with Texas law.)
What complicated the surrogate
decision-making process were the
statements made by DeBakey before he
lost consciousness, that “...doctors had to
do what they need to do.” This was
interpreted by the family as an acceptance
of the need for surgery as somewhat of an
inescapable medical fact. Whether this
was a correct interpretation, only DeBakey
himself can attest to. In light of these
seemingly contradictory patient’s wishes,
the surrogates should have adhered to the
best interest standard instead. When
doing so, surrogates should consider the
formerly autonomous patient’s
preferences, values and perspectives only
as far as they affect interpretations of
quality of life, direct benefit, and the like.
How these considerations would have
influenced the family in their decision-
making process is only a guess from my
part, but quite possibly they would have
come to the same conclusion when we
take direct benefit and values into
account. The only argument that could be
used to choose to forgo surgery and to
“…let nature take its course…” is the
consideration of the prospective quality
of life. An active, take-charge personality
like DeBakey arguably could have ended
up being quite unhappy in a dependent
state (e.g., bed-ridden) if that would have
been the outcome. Luckily, erring on the
side of active surgical intervention turned
out well in this case, and illustrates that
even for a seemingly moribund 97-year
old, an aggressive approach may still be
warranted.
Angelique M. Reitsma, MD, MA
Bioethicist
Chesapeake Research Review, Inc.
Visiting Scholar
University of Pennsylvania
Center for Bioethics
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Case Study
Cont. from page 9
U p d a t e
Dr. DeBakey survived the surgery
and is currently participating in
patient rounds, ambulating in a
wheelchair.  He is happy the
doctors saved his life, and surmises
that he was “in denial” when he
refused the surgery.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
JUNE
May 31
–June 1 Doing Health Care Ethics, A workshop on clinical and organizational ethics. Sponsored by the
Georgetown University Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
Visit http://clinicalbioethics.georgetown.edu/ or e-mail seamanm@georgetown.edu for more
information.
4-9 Intensive Bioethics Course, sponsored by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown,
Washington, DC.  For more information, visit http://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/.
20-22 “What is needed to do ethics well?” Sponsored by Sentara Center for Healthcare Ethics.
Marriott City Center, Newport News, Virginia. Contact Julia West at (757) 388-4263,
jmwest@sentara.com.
21-22 Bridges to Latino Health: Si Se Puede! Sponsored by the Loyola University Chicago Public Health
Action Project, Chicago, IL. Visit http://bioethics.lumc.edu.
JULY
13-14 Pediatric Bioethics Conference, sponsored by the Seattle Children’s Treuman Katz Center for
Pediatric Bioethics. Bell Harbor International Conference Center, Seattle, Washington. Contact
angel.latterell@seattlechildrens.org for more information.
26 Ethics Committees in Action.  Sponsored by MHECN and the Beacon Institute.  Bon Secour
Spiritual Center, Marriotsville, MD.  Visit www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn, or e-mail
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu.
AUGUST
6 Summer Seminar in Health Care Ethics, sponsored by the University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington. For more information, contact mms23@u.washington.edu.
SEPTEMBER
18 Stem cell research: Are we ready for clinical trials?  Speaker: David Magnus, PhD, Director,
Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, Stanford University. Sponsored by the University of
Pennsylvania’s Center for Bioethics. 3401 Market St., Ste. 321, Philadelphia, PA. RSVP to
clinksca@mail.med.upenn.edu or call (215) 898-7136.
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